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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATEOFUTAH,
P1aintiff/ Appe1lee,

v.

Case No. 20150357-CA

BILLY ROHWEDDER,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The State incorrectly argues that Mr. Rohwedder has not shown sufficient error
for reversal. He repeatedly asked for his case to be dismissed for a speedy trial violation
observing that his counsel made the requests over his objection and the court erroneously
0W

failed to inquire into the nature of those objections. Mr. Rohwedder was also denied due
process in his right to self-represent and standby counsel ineffectively failed to take steps
to secure Mr. Rohwedder's access to law and to witnesses essential to his defense. Finally,
the court gave Mr. Rohwedder a choice to be tried under two prejudicial options: sitting
still or revealing his leg shackles, but erred because it had a third and much less
prejudicial option: a taser vest.

1
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
The court failed to adequately assess Mr.
Rohwedder's repeated complaint that his counsel
ineffectively continued the case over his objection.
The State argues that Mr. Rohwedder cannot support a speedy trial violation
when he asked for most of the continuances and, even if so it asserts the record does not
support his claim that counsel asked for these continuances over his objection. Aple's Br.
at 8.
While Mr. Rohwedder admittedly requested multiple continuances through counsel,
the record repeatedly affirms, contrary to the State's argument, that Mr. Rohwedder
objected to his counsel's actions in pursuing those continuances. R. 66-67, 77, 80, 124,
131, 146-49, 151-52, 176-79, 324-26, 343-46, 407-11, 425, 534-37, 706:7, 61, 710:6,
711:14, 712:3-4. Counsel told the court that Mr. Rohwedder had clearly asserted his
speedy trial rights, yet counsel did not act to protect those rights. R. 305:5-6. Over and
over, Mr. Rohwedder told the court that his counsel repeatedly delayed the case against
his wishes and asked to represent himself. R. 77, 80, 146-49, 151-52 (arguing in
November 2013 that counsel "has intentionally requested a series of unnecessary delays"
and asking to represent himself) (emphasis added), 176-79, 324-26, 343-46, 407-11
(arguing in March 2015 that his attorney was "intentionally delaying'' the case "in direct
opposition to petitioner's speedy trial demand"), 495-96, 706:12-13, 710:6, 711: 14, 712:34.
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These repeated objections required the court to investigate the complaints, which
it failed to do. "When a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, a trial court 'must

make some reasonah/,e, non-suggesti:ve efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's
la

complaints."' State v. LJJvell, 1999 UT 40,

1 27,

984 P.2d 382 (citing St.al.e v. Pursiflll, 746

P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added)). When the defendant alleges
dissatisfaction with trial counsel, the court must "apprise itself of the facts necessary to
determine whether the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has
deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an
extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated but for
substitution." Pursijell, 746 P.2d at 273. "Even when the trial judge suspects that the
defendant's requests are disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial
process and to delay the trial, perfuncwry questioning is not sujficient." Id. (emphasis added);

Vess~, 967 P.2d at 962.
The trial court never asked counsel one time if they requested continuances over
~

Mr. Rohwedder's objection, even though Mr. Rohwedder said over and over that they
were. The court's failure to even engage in perfunctory questioning amounted to an
abuse of discretion. Id.
The State argues that counsel had legitimate reasons in obtaining the
continuances, such as a competency inquiry or a failure to transport. Aple's Br. at 15.
While counsel may have had several valid reasons for pursuing a few of the continuances,
they did not have them for the clear majority of them. Nor does counsel have the luxury
of continuing the case repeatedly if the defendant has asserted his constitutional right to a

3
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speedy trial, as Mr. Rohwedder did. Peopk v. Phillips, 31 Cal. App. 3d 483, 486, I 07 Cal.
Rptr. 386, 388 (Ct. App. 1973) ("Counsel cannot waive indirectly the very constitutional
rights which ... must be personally waived by defendant"). Given that Mr. Rohwedder
ultimately represented himself, allowing counsel whom he did not want to represent him
to further delay the case only added insult to injury. This court reversed because the trial
court did not inquire into his dissatisfaction with counsel and desire to self-represent and
it should also reverse because the trial court failed to inquire into his dissatisfaction with
counsel's numerous continuance requests.
This case is like State v. Neal, in which the Court of Appeals of Oregon dismissed a
case for a speedy trial violation. There, the defendant "was consistent and unequivocal in
demanding a speedy trial" and would not lose his right because his counsel requested a
continuance without his consent, absent some sort of good cause. State v. Neal, 260 Or.
App. 753, 759, 320 P.3d 664, 668 (2014). No such cause is present here for the numerous
continuances made without Mr. Rohwedder's consent.
The State also contends that Mr. Rohwedder cannot show harm. Aple's Br. at 17.
However, if, as the record shows, Mr. Rohwedder asserted his right to speedy trial years
before his actual trial, then the court would have been obligated to dismiss his case. As
Mr. Rohwedder argued, he lost the testimony of several potential witnesses in the case. R.
706: 12-13, 16, 61; 709:20-21. But he does not have to demonstrate harm. A speedy trial
violation is presumptively prejudicial, given that harm "can rarely be shown." Doggett v.

United States, 505 V .S. 64 7, 655 (1992) (finding speedy trial violation presumptively
prejudicial because of time's erosion of evidence).

4
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POINT II
Standby counsel ineffectively failed to procure key
defense witnesses

The State asserts that when Mr. Rohwedder chose to represent himself, he waived
any right to claim the effective assistance of counsel. Aple's Br. at 18, 23. But that is not
Mr. Rohwedder's claim. Clearly, he chose to self-represent. But he repeatedly asked for
the resources to do this job and the court's failure to provide him those resources violated
his right to self-representation, see Aplt's Br. at 29, and standby counsel also acted
ineffectively in failing to fulfill the court's requests.

In Staie v. Bakalov, the Utah Supreme Court held that a pro se defendant, who
consistently refased to accept state-provided resources, forfeited any claim that he was
deprived of due process:
[f]he [trial] court, in recognition of [Bakalov's "limited ability to locate and
contact witnesses], extended Bakalov courtesies not mandated by the rules,
repeatedly reminded him of the need to secure defense witnesses, patiently
reviewed with him his list of proposed witnesses to determine who could be
relevant, and then allowed him to subpoena all those deemed relevant.
Despite this effort, defendant was consistently unprepared. Moreover, he
declined the resources available to him. He refused to cooperate with
standby counsel who could have advised him procedurally or utilized the
services of LDA investigators and the sheriffls office to locate witnesses. He
rejected the benefits of a full defense investigation conducted by LDA
investigators for the first trial, labeling the investigation as a "sham." He
also failed to profitably use the additional telephone privileges given him
while in jail.
St,at,e v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,

1 68,

979 P.2d 799, 820-21. No such facts occurred here.

The court did not allow Mr. Rohwedder to subpoena witnesses himself, even though he
complained repeatedly that he needed their presence. Mr. Rohwedder was the opposite
litP

5
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of Bakalov: he was prepared and had a list of witnesses he wanted subpoenaed. R. 443,
704: 122; 706: 16-18, 33, 35, 58-60; 707:6-8. But the court continually directed him to his
standby counsel, rather than fulfilling the duty itself or allowing Mr. Rohwedder access to
the sheriff's office or the public defender investigators. R. 706:21; 709: 12, 21-22 ("[t]he
Court doesn't subpoena witnesses for you"). The court could have also, like Bakalov, have
allowed Mr. Rohwedder increased telephone privileges, investigative resources and other
methods of securing his witnesses. Standby counsel, additionally, failed to send the
subpoenas as directed. And, contrary to the State's argument, standby counsel can be
ineffective. See Aplt's Br. at 24-25. Thus, not only was Mr. Rohwedder denied his right to
self-representation and right to due process, but standby counsel ineffectively failed to
procure the witnesses as requested.
The State also argues that because the record is silent about counsel's efforts to
procure individual witnesses, this court should not find counsel ineffective. Aple's Br. at
25-26. But the record is clear. Counsel did not send out a single subpoena, yet Mr.
Rohwedder filed objection after objection naming witnesses he wanted called to trial. R.
443, 704:122; 706:16-18, 33, 35, 58-60; 707:6-8. Standby counsel promised they would
be a "resource" for Mr. Rohwedder and attempt to locate these witnesses. R. 706:21;
709:21-22. But the record contains no evidence that they made any efforts. 1
The State also claims the record does not reveal what legal resources Mr.
Rohwedder received. Aple's Br. at 26. Even the State acknowledges that Mr. Rohwedder

1

While Mr. Rohwedder could have developed the record better on remand, the record as
it stands reflects counsel's failure to conduct the needed work.
6
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only received "two short summaries on the Utah Rules of Evidence" and a laptop at trial
with access to the Rules of Evidence and Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 705: 6; 706: 21;
Aple's Br. at 26. But it argues Mr. Rohwedder cannot show prejudice from any sort of
failure to timely provide him with this information. Aple's Br. at 26.
This was an inadequate list of resources. First, he was only given the bulk of it the
day of trial and at no point was he given access to "legal materials" such as caselaw, or
investigative resources and witness interviews. S1,a,1,e v. Siwa, 107 Wash. App. 605, 625, 27
P.3d 663, 676 (200 I). Prisoners must be given "adequate law libraries or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S. Ct.
1491, 1498, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (U.S. 1977). Mr. Rohwedder had neither. And handing
someone a copy of the Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure as his trial begins was
not adequate for a person charged with trying his case in mere moments. Because he was
deprived of these resources on a timely basis, he could not effectively represent himself
and was denied due process.

POINT III
The court erred by preventing Mr. Rohwedder from
wearing a taser vest that would not have forced him
into two prejudicial options

The State argues that Mr. Rohwedder voluntarily showed his leg restraints to the
jury and therefore, waived any claim that he was prejudiced. Aple's Br. at 27. Because the
court was willing to hide the restraints when sitting down, it argues, Mr. Rohwedder
cannot complain that it did not choose his version of restraints. Aple's Br. at 31-32.

7
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However, as Mr. Rohwedder asserted, he had two prejudicial choices: sit static in
one spot and never move or move with leg restraints. Aplt's Br. at 34; R. 706:67-69. The
first choice would lead jurors to assume he was restrained because he could never move.
For the second choice, they would know he was restrained, but at least he had the

~

freedom of movement and ability to interact with the witnesses. Mr. Rohwedder felt he
had to choose the least prejudicial of his options, which to him was to move with the
restraints. R. 706:69. Thus, the choice was not truly voluntary, since a person in custody
is not free to make voluntary choices about his restraints. Bako1ov, 1999 UT 45, 1 20 ("If a
choice presented to a petitioner is constitutionally offensive, then the choice cannot be
voluntary''); Stat£ v. Houtz, 714 P. 2d 677, 6 78 (Utah 1986).
But the court had a third, non-prejudicial option: the taser vest. The device would
quickly restrain Mr. Rohwedder and it would also allow him to move without prejudicing
him with the jury. See Wilkins v. Davis, 832 F.3d 547, 555 (5th Cir. 2016) (upholding use of
taser belt at trial to restrain defendant who tried to violently escape multiple times and
finding no evidence that jury could see it); Ja.ckway v. Woods, No. 15-CV-11491, 2016 WL
304739, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2016) (no evidence a taser belt was visible to a jury).
"A taser belt can emit a blast that incapacitates a prisoner for eight seconds." Stat£ v.
Chappk, 145 Wash. 2d 310, 326, 36 P.3d 1025, 1033 n. 5 (2001).

Mr. Rohwedder was entitled to be tried in a manner that was not prejudicial to
him, which included his "right to be tried without being shackled" when a much less
restrictive and non-prejudicial method was available to him. SfLlte v. MaLlsen, 2002 UT App
345, 18, 57 P.3d 1134; Staf£v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469,473 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rohwedder asks this court to find that the district court erroneously failed to
inquire into his multiple requests that his counsel continued the case over his objection,
that he was denied due process in his exercise of his right to self-represent and that he was
not tried in the garb of innocence. The court should reverse on these bases.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day ofDecember, 2016.

Isl Samuel P. Newton
SAMUEL P. NEWTON
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant

RULE 24 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to rule 24(f)( I )(C), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I certify that this brief has
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authorities, and addenda.
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